exaggerated opinion" concerning the importance of monopoly; but by the end of the 1950s he thought that "the doctrine" of monopolistic competition was "exhausted". It is likely that Stigler contributed to this process: his "negativism probably hindered further development ..." (Rosen 1993, 816) . xviii Hostility to various approaches to economics was not unique to Chicago and to Friedman and Stigler. Keynesians were hostile to the revival of the Quantity Theory, but they failed to undermine the revival. In contrast, the Chicago School were (at least for a while) successfully hostile to monopolistic competition, which according to Bishop (1964, 36) had become widely accepted and was opposed only by "some determined pockets of resistance". At an AEA symposium on Monopolistic Competition, the postwar Chicago tactics were perceived to have been counterproductive to the Chicago cause (Baumol 1964, 44; Bain 1964; Markham 1964; Steiner 1964) . These, or similar perceptions, may have persuaded Friedman and Stigler to decline the invitation to be drawn into empirical testing. This paper argues that the tactics of this hostility were consistent with Stigler's understanding of the sociology of economic knowledge. xix Stigler argued that "the chief work of economic theorists should for the present still be in the theory of perfect competition"; he was also concerned that formalist virtuosity and "a mad scramble for originality [by] our younger theorists", had led to a "poor use of the received doctrines". He (1954a, 9; 1939, 481) wrote disparagingly of "the tones of a stuffy formalist"; and he sought to "temper [the] over-enthusiastic devotees of the cult of correlations". An "indefinite period" (1955a, 300) could be devoted to the new analytical techniques associated with imperfect competition, which had become "almost the dominant concern of economic theorists ... a distracting fad".
xx Monopolistic competition lent itself to one branch of the formalist revolution (mathematical investigations), and with the advance of computing power,
Friedman successfully integrated the quantity theory into the other branch (econometrics). But monopolistic competition was denied the momentum that would have resulted from Stigler and Friedman accepting the challenge offered by Chamberlin and Archibald.
Stigler warned that "intellectual and political influences are extraordinarily subtle and difficult to trace or measure"; "all short answers are wrong". xxi He (1988c, 9) concluded that Keynes sought to be, not a dentist, but "a brain surgeon who operated on ideologies"; and this analogy could be applied to Stigler and Friedman who sought to influence the process of knowledge construction and destruction. This essay examines the Chicago counter-revolution as a product of their "superior understanding" not so much of the behaviour of economic variables, but of the sociology of professional economic knowledge: "our ratio of objective scientific work to policy rationalisation is high only in comparison to other social sciences"; "We wish to be scientists ...
We wish also to be important ... A curious tension" (Stigler 1975, 316-7; 1976a, 352-3) .
Friedman and Stigler spent time discussing the nature of influence and how opinions were to be changed (Stigler (1980, 353; 1988c, 11; McCloskey 1994, 341-2) . xxii This paper assumes that they behaved as if they were self-conscious counter-revolutionaries. Stigler (1957b, 9; 1954b, 103) noted that economists have a tendency to "float on the tide of theory". He reflected that empirical generalisations "fail to achieve the continuity and the widespread influence of the formal theories".
Stigler's 'model' of the sociology of economic knowledge 3.1 Theories are trumps
xxiii He was also aware that for theorists, statistically derived relationships could be "frankensteins over which he has little or no control".
Galbraith, for example, looked at the same empirical studies as himself but derived opposite inferences (Stigler 1939, 470; 1949a, 96) .
With respect to conclusions that contained policy implications, Stigler (1951, 127-8) sought to elevate received theory over empirical analysis. xxiv The reason for this confidence in orthodoxy was that it was "our most tested and reliable instrument for relating policies to effects"
[emphasis added] (1964a, 421). Received theory, presumably, operated with a considerable advantage. xxv The idea that a new theory "is presumed innocent until shown guilty ... is the exact opposite of the presumption I would use" (1982b, 204; 1978, 191) .
Not all theorists were to be trusted; xxvi unorthodox approaches were sometimes denied the label 'theory'. Galbraith's notion of countervailing power was not a theory but a "dogma" and rested on "allegations" of economic life; in the 1930s it would "have attracted no one". Galbraith's policy implications should be "left untouched" because to quarrel with those implications would imply "that the theory had reached the stage of relevance to policy ... Galbraith cannot persuade us that we should turn our economic problems over to Santa" (1954a, 9-10, 14) . Likewise, monopolistic competition had "failed to initiate a fundamentally new direction of economic theorising" (1988b, 93) .
The crucial importance of internal developments
Stigler criticised the attempt to explain how economic ideas gained currency by reference to environmental factors; objecting to Wesley Mitchell's downgrading of "intellectual stunt [s] [to]
a secondary rather than a primary force". Stigler concluded that the "dominant influence upon the working range of economic theorists is the set of internal values and pressures of the discipline. The subjects for study are posed by the unfolding course of scientific developments" (1965b [1960] , 18, 22, 27-8; see also Sowell 1987, 498) . Friedman found Mitchell's course on the history of economic thought "dull" and his view that "theories had no life of their own" to be "in sharp contrast to the history of thought as developed many years later by George Stigler".
Friedman shared Stigler's views about the importance of "the internal logic of the subject ... The contrast between Chicago and Columbia was sharp" (Friedman and Friedman 1998, 44) .
The elite and the masses
It was Stigler's ability to set the agenda (positively and negatively) which underpinned his influence among economists (McCann and Perlman 1993, 997) ; he believed that any assessment of a scholar's achievements should include "not only what he wrought but also what he prevented" (Stigler 1990a, 12) . Stigler (1969c, 227; 1951, 126; 1982a, 60) clearly distinguished between "major scientific entrepreneurs" and the rest, some of whom could only employ "an inferior mind", and some of whom were "ersatz economists". They entered the market as demanders, not suppliers, of ideas; and conference participants reminded Stigler (1977, 441) of travelling salesman exchanging stale jokes. He believed that economists were analogous to the purchasers of second hand automobiles and he wondered why some ideas "wouldn't run far or carry many passengers" (1986 [1982] , 134-5, [1979] , 340). Part of the explanation involved a quality differential: "which socialist propagandist has been as logically lucid as Friedman?" Stigler (1978, 201) concluded in his study of 'The Literature of Economics' that two thirds of the articles surveyed were virtually worthless. xxvii There were commonly only about six really first class scholars in any field (1963b, 37); a small minority in the profession had "superb instincts"
with regard to the pursuit of ideas. The 2 or 3 percent of the profession who were "active and ambitious" were also "reform[ers] of economic science " (1988d, 95) . Occasionally, "economists-missionaries" successfully ventured into the territory of "apprehensive and hostile natives" (1984, 304) ; but academic consensus (which could be unreliable) was achieved not by a professional "plebiscite", but only by an elite group within the profession (1991, 44; 1985, 1) .
Science was defined as the consensus interpretations that emerged from this process. xxviii In contrast, for the "mass" of scholars in any discipline, risk aversion, and a desire to preserve already acquired human capital, created a bias in favour of scientific conservatism.
Given this structure of the sociology of economic knowledge, the "most irresistible" of all the weapons of scholarship was "infinite repetition"; a "form of the classical Chinese torture" (1965b, 4; 1984, 311; 1986 [1979] , 339). Stigler (1965b Stigler ( [1959 , 286) was impressed by the Fabian Society's "effectiveness in shifting opinion. If enough able and determined men -and the number in the Fabian group was almost unbelievably small -denounce and denounce again a deficiency, that deficiency becomes grave".
The technique of the huckster
Stigler displayed an understanding of "the technique of the huckster" by which change is effected amongst economists. He believed that intellectuals suffered from "romantic wishfulness" in their understanding about influence; a Darwinian "survivor technique" was useful: "if I wish to know whether a tiger or a panther is the stronger animal, I put them in the same cage and return after a few hours"; "Great economists are those who influence the profession as a whole, and this they can do if their doctrines do not involve too great a change from the views and the knowledge of the rank and file of the science. It is simply impossible for men to apprehend and to adopt wholly unfamiliar ideas ... New ideas are even harder to sell than new products ... One must put on the best face possible and much is possible. Wares must be shouted -the human mind is not a divining rod that quivers over truth. The techniques of persuasion also in the realm of ideas are generally repetition, inflated claims, and disproportionate emphases, and they have preceded and accompanied the adoption on a large scale of almost every new idea in economic theory ... It is possible by mere skill of presentation to create a fad, but a deep and lasting impression on the science will be achieved only if the idea meets the more durable standards of the science. Among these standards is truth, but of course it is not the only one" (Stigler 1975, 318-9; 1988b, 99, 108; 1968a, 72-4; 1955b, 294-6) . xxix The price mechanism operated here, as elsewhere: "It is perfectly reasonable for individuals to purchase intellectual integrity as well as meat and wine -always provided that the price is not too high" (Stigler 1988e, 8) .
Stigler bemoaned the "attitudes of professional economists ... when economists agree that a movement is inevitable, it is not" (1950a, 30, 34) . He argued that the knowledge production industry was a competitive industry in which "confused" participants would "watch their customers vanish, their best employees migrate, their assets dissipate". A monopolist was "overwhelmingly dominated by forces over which he has negligible control" (1963b, 42).
Stigler clearly had an ability to provoke his audience (Samuelson 1962, 9) ; xxx as illustrated by his Harvard lecture, 'The Politics of Political Economists', on the "mysterious intellectual osmosis" that economists are subjected to. Radicals, he argued, tended to be anti-empirical, but scientifically trained economists tended to be politically conservative because of their exposure to price theory: "We shall no doubt continue to bend before a strong [anti-conservative] wind, but I consider it a remarkable effect of our professional discipline that we shall not be contributing to the wind" (1959a, 528-5).
xxxi Later, Stigler (1965b, 48-9) pondered about the role of "fashion" in economics and the "truly remarkable" process by which Keynesian economics diverted attention away from more traditional research agendas. He then echoed his Harvard sentiments: economics had become highly respectable but was "lacking in promise in basic influence on policy in the future. I do not know whether it is an occasion for pride or for regret that the economist is using Marquis of Queensbury arguments in an arena where emotional brass knuckles continue in fashion".
Stigler was impatient with alternative perspectives, and from the late 1970s he "governed" the ethics of conversation at Chicago. Criticisms of his work, even those which appeared in major journals, often did not command his attention or respect; xxxii and according to one of his Chicago colleagues, exchanges with Stigler were "likely to be terminated by a positivist edict and a sneer" (McCloskey 1994, 14) . Stigler (1978, 200-201, 185 ) made numerous other perceptive comments about the nature of controversy in economics: "if controversy is active almost every proposition seems open to debate, and the course of controversy shifts as rapidly as the situs of a fox hunt -indeed, a series of simultaneous and intersecting fox hunts". The fundamentally pervasive concept of competition had long been treated with "the kind of casualness with which one treats of the intuitively obvious". But Frank Knight's Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, with its comprehensive and "meticulous" discussion of perfect competition was counterproductive for the Chicago School: it "did most to drive home to economists generally the austere nature of the rigorously defined concept and so prepared the way for the widespread reaction against it in the 1930s". Stigler (1956a, 270) reflected on Alfred Marshall's opposition to this ongoing attempt to attach "more restrictive" conditions to the concept of competition. According to Stigler, Marshall's opposition was motivated by sociology of knowledge considerations: he sought to avoid introducing complications that might lessen the appeal of competition ("He wished to retain for competition its traditional claim as the great engine of progress ...").
The fox hunts of controversy
The "more persuasive" defence of the concept of perfect competition is that it has "defeated its newer rivals in the decisive area: the day-to-day work of the economic theorist" (1957b, 1, 11, 17) . Price theory was scientifically more mature, and therefore stronger, than macroeconomics because of the homogeneity of doctoral citation practices -with the exception of the "exclusive appeal of monopolistic competition to Harvard" (Stigler and Friedland 1975, 503; 1979) .
"Scientific literature is to a considerable degree controversial literature. New ideas are sold very much the way new automobiles are sold: by exaggerating their superiority over the older models ... Scientific innovation proceeds more by disparagement of rivals than by excessive self-praise,
perhaps because it appears more modest. The role of controversy is indeed to stimulate interest and animosity ... The sterility of the early Walrasian system arose because it was ignored by most economists and adopted by a few but criticised by almost none. Milton Friedman's work was bound to be spread rapidly in the science and to achieve a wide scope and high rigour because of his wondrous gift of eliciting the probing attention of eminent contemporaries" (1969c, 222). Friedman was "a masterful peddler ... intellectuals sell their wares to customers, and they -not the customers -do most of the adapting" (1975, 321, 315) . 
Neglect -the highway to oblivion
Chicago has inscribed on the front of its Social Science Research Building an approximation to Kelvin's dictum "When you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind" (McCloskey 1986, 7; Stigler 1988c, 12) . Knight (1960, 166, n18) thought that this statement "very largely means in practice, If you cannot measure, measure anyhow", and Viner "rejoined that our knowledge after measurement would still be meagre and unsatisfactory" (cited by Stigler 1982c, 23) . Stigler (1992, 462) welcomed "formidable" empirical challenges to economists: "Ease of solution ... is not the best guide in the selection of agenda for scientific research". Stigler (1959a, 529) and Friedman were prepared to find proxies for all sorts of variables, believing that the empirical economics was the only way to obtain a reliable feel for the way an economic system functioned. The literature of the public utility specialists was defective because it had failed to measure the effects of regulation; but Stigler and Friedland (1962, 3, 11) were prepared to ask "impertinent" empirical questions to remedy this defect. Stigler (1965d, 62-3, 68, 57) reflected on the "truly remarkable ... degree of indolence or lack of curiosity" which economists had exhibited by not empirically examining the regulatory experience.
Economists had "found imperfections, because this is an imperfect world", and they had advocated state intervention without investigating the consequences of intervention. Asking new empirical questions could lead to "very striking" results. Economists had neglected the questions that Stigler had formulated: they had "not studied the past". This neglect had led to policy consequences that relied upon an exaggerated respect for the competence of the state and a diminished faith in market solutions.
But Stigler and Friedman declined to provide fuel for the locomotive of the monopolistic competition revolution of which they disapproved. This decision may have been influenced by Stigler's sociological perceptions: "Once an idea is widely accepted, it is guaranteed a measure of immortality. Its decline in popularity is more often due to changing interests than to contrary evidence, no matter how powerful that evidence may be ... Even to be demolished is better for one's self-esteem than to be ignored: It requires some ability to excite and especially to outrage one's fellow professionals ... Neglect is the highway to oblivion" (Stigler 1988a, 67, 75, 112, 157, 159, 97, 162, 166, 213, 216; Stigler and Kindahl 1973, 721, n6 the "beginning student of physics does not demur at the absence of friction", so the student of economics is exposed first of all to perfect competition: "competition is a better single assumption, even on the basis of realism, than monopoly" (Stigler 1946, 23) . According to Chamberlin (1946, 416) , early reviewers objected that the "natural and easy way" would have been to begin with the individual firm and monopolistic competition. Stigler was prompted to adopt this sequence because to reverse it would have meant "not merely a reversal of order, but a revolution in the author's thinking". From a pedagogical perspective, perfect competition and monopoly possess a simplicity and an accepted theoretical framework that cannot be found in the later chapters on oligopoly and monopolistic competition. Stigler (1949a, 104) was alarmed about the nature of knowledge construction and destruction in economics: "ours has become a flabby science". xxxv Means' theory of administered pricing had at first incited a lot of controversy and empirical analysis; later it displayed "growing anaemia; it is fair to say that economists abandoned the close study of the subject, less because its lack of scientific import was established than because it became boring" (1968a [1962] , 235). The ideas of those who found a clash between traditional price theory and observed behaviour often had a "Phoenix property"; but "It takes a locomotive of sorts to keep an idea moving in science"; "The reworking of predecessors' ideas will seldom lead to very fresh work, and after a while this source seems to become boring -at least these economists tend to leave economic theory after a while"; "A concept without enemies ... is also a concept without informed friends" (1982a, 52; 1951, 126) . Paul Samuelson (1967, 108, n5, 113, 116, 138) In contrast, Stigler (1955b, 301) described the 1930s as exhibiting "an excess of originality".
The Emergence of the Chicago School of Anti Monopolistic Competition
His thesis supervisor, Frank Knight, stated that "If there is anything I can't stand it's a Keynesian and a believer in monopolistic competition" (Samuelson 1983, 7) . xxxvii But Friedman and
Stigler did not share Knight's fatalistic despair about the Chicago project for social and economic transformation; xxxviii neither did they share his lack of interest in empirical or policyorientated economics or his belief in the inherent contradiction between thought and action (Stigler 1982a, 167; Buchanan 1991; Kern 1987, 640; Patinkin 1973, 796, 804-5) . Both attended his seminars on the sociologist Max Weber; he was their dominant dinner table subject of conversation (Wallis 1993, 775) . According to Shils, Knight "offered a great deal to a sociologist" (1981, 181, 184; see also Schweitzer 1975) . This sociological perceptiveness involved doubt about the outcomes of rational debate: "Frank Knight's First Law of Talk" was that "Cheaper talk drives out of circulation that which is less cheap" (Knight, cited by Patinkin 1973, 807 (Reder 1982, 4; 1987, 415) . "The Chicago School of Anti-Monopolistic Competition" was first explicitly defined and described by Chamberlin (1957, 296) ; only then did economists begin to refer to Chicago as a School (Stigler 1988a, 150) . xxxix The modern Chicago School began to take shape; culminating in the famous 1960 'Coase versus Pigou' evening at Aaron Director's house which was "the most exciting intellectual event" of Stigler's life. The evening ended up with "no votes for Pigou" and effectively partitioned economics into two epochs: A.C. and B.C.
("Before Coase"). According to Stigler (1983, 221; 1988a, 75, 148-169; 1992, 456; 1972b, 11) the previous epoch had confused "all economists ... from at least 1890 until 1961". xl The realisation that Pigou had previously obtained such a "hold", even in places like Chicago, generated both enthusiasm and sociological reflectiveness. It also laid out a detailed research agenda for the Chicago School and the Journal of Law and Economics (Coase 1995, 242-4 Knight had not provided a Chicago agenda of research (Stigler 1973b, 520) ; only in the late 1950s was Friedman able to fully engage his Keynesian opponents. This was a fightundertaken with strategic considerations in mind -against the "conditioned reflex[es]" of "entrenched Keynesianism" (Friedman 1968, 5, n2) . In 1958, Friedman was joined at Chicago by Stigler, who, intellectually, became "more vertically integrated" (Rosen 1993, 814 (microeconomics, controversy, and sociology of economic knowledge) produced an extraordinarily creative phase, for which he would later be awarded a Nobel Prize (Stigler 1961b (Stigler , 1962a . Harry Johnson's arrival in 1959 also strengthened the Chicago School, which was, according to Bhagwati (1977, 225-6) to be negligible and the imperfections rather of government intervention were the subject of active research".
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In terms of microeconomic controversy, both Cambridges had powerful alternative theories to the Chicago belief that consumers direct the production process (Stigler 1976a, 347 ).
Chamberlin (1933) subtitled his book A Reorientation of the Theory of Value, and he devoted
his career to the proposition that the firm is the essential structural unit of the economy (1957, 44) . Joan Robinson (1933, v; 1934, 105) attempted to develop Sraffa's "pregnant suggestion"
that the whole theory of value should be reconstructed around the concept of monopoly, thus "emancipating economic analysis from the tyranny of the assumption of perfect competition".
These were self-consciously revolutionary attempts to construct a general parameter theory (Schneider 1967, 144) , which could be combined with general equilibrium models (Chamberlin 1957, 68; Jaffe 1934, 27; Triffin 1940) . Together with Keynes' work, the monopolistic competition revolution captivated the economics profession both between the wars and in the immediate post-war period (Keynes JMK XXIX [1938], 175-6; Nichol 1934; Galbraith 1948; Bain 1948; Bishop 1964) . In the Preface to his seventh edition, Chamberlin (1956) noted that his bibliographic supplement had expanded by 806 titles in the eight years since the sixth edition. This was more than the entire period prior to 1948: "important evidence" that monopolistic competition was acquiring the mantle of generality.
Traditional economic theory had created a presumption against social interference in the market place; but imperfect competition questioned the generally accepted conclusions of economic theory (Morrison 1934, 30; Harrod 1934, 463; J. Robinson 1952, 925-6) . Although Chamberlin was personally quite conservative, monopolistic competition was associated with the weakening of competitive ideology, and its supporters tended to take their stand on a variety of positions that were antithetical to Chicago economics (Fellner 1967, 12) . xlv The immediate post-war period had witnessed "frequent and heavy bombardment[s]" on monopolistic competition from
Chicago (Markham 1964, 53) . These tactics were perceived to have been counter-productive to the Chicago cause: "It must be emphasised here that even the writings of those who would minimise the contribution of monopolistic competition, by their very number and vociferousness combine to constitute an encomiast, as it were, praising by strong (and frequent)
damns" (Baumol 1964, 44) .
Economic theory had long accepted the coexistence of perfect and imperfect competition, and Stigler (1948, 915) concluded that the latter was "a minor variant" from competition. According to Arnold Harberger, the behaviour of the U.S. manufacturing sector could be accurately analysed through the model of perfect competition; the per capita welfare losses associated with monopoly amounted to no more than $2 (1954; see also Friedman 1965, 55) . But Machlup (1939, 231, 236) concluded that the "increased dose of realism that was won for economic theory" by monopolistic competition had led economists to emphasise product differentiation and the frequent occurrence of oligopoly. The new theories had "clear practical value" for policy makers.
xlvi These microeconomic disputes were ferociously debated: one of the discussants of the Galbraith-Stigler AEA session on 'Fundamental Characteristics of the American Economy' concluded that the author of the notion of countervailing power was "one of the most effective enemies of both capitalism and democracy" (McCord Wright 1954, 30) .
The cultures of Chicago and the two Cambridges appear to leave an indelible imprint on their respective students, and on the subject matter of their doctoral dissertations (American Economic Review 1960, 864-91) . Colander and Klamer's (1987) survey revealed that only 6 per cent of Chicago students thought that price rigidities were very important (compared to 38 per cent at Harvard); and 84 per cent of Chicago students (but only 7 per cent of MIT students)
agreed that inflation was primarily a monetary phenomenon. Robinson and the effect of price discrimination on output (Stigler 1966, 214, n12) . xlviii Friedman and Stigler concluded that monopolistic competition "possesses none of the attributes that would make it a truly useful general theory ... It is therefore incompetent to deal with a host of important problems". Its contribution has been limited to "enriching the vocabulary available for describing industrial experience" (Friedman 1953, 38-9) ; of which "something like 98 per cent of the general [industrial organisation] literature is concerned, explicitly or implicitly with the question of monopoly" (Stigler 1959a, 530) . Monopolistic competition appears only in a single paragraph (plus the Appendix) in The Organisation of Industry; a paragraph which concludes that "It has not been found useful in the analysis of concrete economic problems" (Stigler 1968a, 13; in contrast, see Scherer 1970 ). Stigler's (1937, 707-8, 710, 713) second appearance in the professional literature, however, was an essay on 'A Generalisation of the Theory of Imperfect Competition' in which he suggested a framework for research in the "imperfections of competition in agriculture". The essay examined the realism of the assumptions of perfect competition, concluding that one could "add much realism" by eliminating some of these assumptions; the non-economic motives for land ownership by farmers "seem exceptionally amenable to empirical investigation".
Chamberlin and Archibald versus Chicago

Chamberlin's Challenge
The Theory of Monopolistic Competition began as a doctoral dissertation (submitted in 1927) and went through eight editions . According to Stigler (1988a , 96), Chamberlin (1899 was "possessed" by his theory. xlix Alfred Sherrard (1951, 126, 142) thought that Chamberlin's contribution had so far proven more "illusory" than revolutionary: "Another wing, or perhaps a porch, has been added to economic theory; but the structure retains its original form ... But as deliberate product differentiation, advertising and salesmanship take the centre of the stage, economic theory in the traditional sense must depart. A revolution in analysis is called for -a new set of questions, a new philosophical foundation". Wallis (1949, 559) suggested that monopolistic competition theories should be tested to see how well they could "organise, predict or rationalise observed advertising behaviour".
Chamberlin devoted less of his career to the empirical investigation of his favoured market structure than to his acute sense of product differentiation; insisting that every Harvard PhD.
candidate understood the precise differences between imperfect competition and monopolistic competition (Johnson and Johnson 1978, 153; see, for example, Chamberlin 1937 (1957, 13-5, 17, 26, 300, 305) . Chamberlin sought to overcome this "heavy" legacy by reformulating his theory to assist the process of measurement (1957, 24, 43, 70-91; 1957 [1948] , 226-249). He (1957, concluded that his hypothesis had come into existence following the 'classical' scientific process outlined in 'The Methodology of Positive Economics'.
He had edited the proceeding of an International Economic Association conference on
Monopoly and Competition (1954b) , contributing an essay on the difficulties of 'Measuring the Degree of Monopoly and Competition', which included a suggested classification of the concept of monopolistic competition (1954a, 265). Stigler (1963c, 109) concluded that economics would have "suffered grievously" had he been research 'dictator' in the 1940s. li Chamberlin (1957, 140, 299 ) also took an interest in this evolution of Stigler's position. As a graduate student at Chicago, Stigler organised Saturday morning seminars on monopolistic competition in the belief that Chamberlin's work would revolutionise economics (Wallis 1993) . About one third of the first edition of Stigler's The Theory of Price lii was devoted to a discussion of monopolistic competition (1946, v, 195-302, 312-4) . liii Referring to "dissatisfaction with the neoclassical theory of competition", Stigler complained that economics was in an "unsatisfactory state". There were, he argued, two obstacles before perfect competition could render to monopolistic competition the mantle of generality. The first was variety, that is, the infinite number of conceivable departures from perfect competition. But this was not insurmountable: "it would usually be possible to establish sensible classifications which would reduce the problem to much more manageable proportions, and in fact this has been done in good part". The second was "ignorance ... primarily an ignorance of relevant assumptions ... the more urgent need is for factual knowledge. Until this knowledge becomes available -and this is a slow, accretionary process -the detailed content of the theory of imperfect competition will remain in large degree intuitive" (1946, 197-8, v) . Stigler (1944, 81) objected to the "formalism" associated with the theory: "Real progress in the theory now requires a shift in emphasis from mathematical analysis ... to detailed studies of individual market structures".
Stigler and the importance of testing theories
Friedman dominated the thoughts and practices of the profession as a methodologist, several years before his thoughts on money attracted similar attention. For a decade he was closely involved with methodology, planning at one stage to write a book on the subject. In November 1947 he informed Stigler that "I have gotten involved for various irrelevant reasons in a number of discussions of scientific methodology related to the kind of thing you are talking about"; this interest apparently waned after 1957 (Hammond 1991b, 3, 34; Stigler 1994) . His methodology of positive economics was formulated as a "reaction" to Robinson and Chamberlin, and a "reply" to a series of empirical studies which questioned the relevance of orthodox price theory (Moss 1984; Friedman 1993, 770) . liv Keynesian economics and monopolistic competition share a common concern for the 'accuracy' of assumptions; the early drafts of his methodological essays reveal Friedman's interest in rebutting the assault on microeconomic orthodoxy. 1949b, 22-5, 13, 45; 1949a, 102-4) . Stigler (1955c, 13-14) stated that the dispute between full cost pricing and imperfect competition must "first be settled ... presumably by recourse to empirical tests".
In the preface to the second edition of his textbook, Stigler (1952, v) sought to "emphasize ... how the theory is tested by evidence" and to "incite the student to attempt to test parts of the theory for himself ... I can assure him that some parts of the theory in this book are unquestionably wrong -and I should like to know which they are". Stigler (1955a, 300 ) also stated that "One can test empirically a crude theory as well as a refined one". In a scathing article, entitled 'Alice in Fundland', Stigler (1967b, 12) ridiculed the "Untrained Minds" of the Securities and Exchange Commission for lacking "the humility to subject its policies to empirical test". He commended the ongoing examination of "untested hypotheses of which we have too many " (1959b, viii) . Later, in his Nobel Lecture (1986 Lecture ( [1982 , 147), he reflected that such explorations were sometimes little more than tests of the "intellectual fertility" of those doing the testing. In a lecture at Chicago, he also reflected on the difficulties of achieving "objective discussion" about empirical work which stirred up strong emotional or moral implications; and he had been previously disappointed with the professional response to his tests of theories of which he disapproved (1984, 306) . In 1947, he "tested" Sweezy's demand theory; lvii but despite his adverse findings, for four decades the kinked demand curve continued to attract the attention of a large proportion of prominent economists (Stigler 1978; 1982b) .
Joan Robinson (1952, 925-6 ) reflected on the lineage of Galbraith's American Capitalism: The Concept of Countervailing Power: "imperfect competition was essentially a debunking movement" which left the defenders of orthodoxy "in an exposed position". Her primary motive for writing about imperfect competition was to demonstrate that wages were not equal to the value of the marginal product of labour and that therefore labour was exploited under capitalism (Robinson 1969, xii; Bishop 1964, 37) . She was also curious about how Galbraith's audience (different from her own) would respond. Galbraith (1954, 2) painted an unattractive picture of the "men who resist any tampering with the rigidly idealised world of our ancestors ... the self-designated protectors of our political morality". lix Sympathetic reviewers found in Galbraith's book an invigorating questioning of "classic premises"; he had "certainly opened a door which will not be closed for a very long time" (Berle 1953, 81, 84) . The methodology of positive economics emphasised the output, not the input side of economic analysis, and in a famous attempt at door closing, Stigler (1954a, 12) "tested" reported the response that Joan Robinson was curious about: Galbraith's work had "extraordinary public appeal". Vining (a non-econometric economic statistician) described Galbraith's work as outlining an agenda for statisticians: "a call to competent students and analysts to direct their attention to the essential descriptive and analytical tasks" (1959, 119) . Stigler (1949b, 23) noted that "the discrepancies between pronouncements and practice are notorious in the field of methodology". But with respect to the testing of hypotheses, "we can be reasonably certain of what is right practice ... Occasionally we lack the data necessary to carry out the tests but lack the slight imagination necessary to rework the theory so it bears on available information and the enormous energy necessary to ferret out the information ... I do not wish to condone our impatience with laborious research, and I hope it will soon disappear" (1951, . Stigler (1943, 532) welcomed Simon Kuznets' pioneering contribution to the "new and ... difficult" field of national income measurement.
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He also attempted to test aspects of public choice theory related to size of legislatures, whilst admitting that his empirical analysis was "long on problems and short on solutions" (Stigler 1976b, 31) .
Qualitative conclusions from the theory of consumer behaviour needed to "tested empirically".
Although the bridge between empirical demand curves and their theoretical counterparts would never be bridged, fruitful progress could still be made by statistically estimating those curves (1939, 472, 476, 481 (1947d) and Employment and Compensation in Education (1950b) . His own extensive empirical work led him to believe that "the classical theory of the market has direct applicability to empirical market determinations ... the applications are manageable in both their data requirements and their methodology" (Stigler and Sherwin 1985, 584) .
For Stigler (1949b, 54 ) the purpose of economics was to generate predictions: "The sole test of a usefulness of an economic theory is the concordance between its predictions and the observable course of events". He argued that there was never likely to be any evidence for the thesis that competition has steadily declined. It was therefore "an obstacle to clear thinking on social policy" which needed to be abandoned. Stigler and Friedland (1983, 258) concluded that the Berle and Means assault on the assumptions of traditional analysis received an "astonishingly uncritical" reception; but traditional analysts continued to work in "complete disregard of The Modern Corporation".
One explanation for the apparent absence of any discernible influence upon traditional economic theory may lie in the observation that "the practice of testing economic theories was still extremely uncommon in the 1930s. Certainly no one dreamt of subjecting Chamberlin's
Monopolistic Competition or Keynes's Treatise to a formal empirical test". A series of tests had, however, been proposed by Chamberlin (1957) , Archibald (1961) and Bishop (1964, 41-3) . But the Chicago opponents of monopolistic competition declined to be drawn into the testing procedures. 1959, . Archibald (1959a, 61-2) doubted if the theory of the firm had ever been tested. Friedman, he argued, had not followed the guidelines of his own "revolutionary" methodology: "Is it not precisely those hypotheses which are wrapped in the cotton wool and authority of 'tradition and folklore' that most urgently require testing ... [Friedman's] purport is to encourage complacency and to discourage that sceptical reexamination of the allegedly obvious that is the prerequisite of progress". contribution to the theory of the firm on the grounds that "His data is personal to him". Agassi retorted: "Then we can ignore his data". Archibald (1960, 210, 213) dissected Jerome Stein's essay on 'The Predictive Accuracy of the Marginal Productivity Theory of Wages' and found it to "lack discriminatory power". There was, therefore, "not much cause for congratulation or confidence" in the marginal productivity approach. Archibald then proposed a test of the marginal productivity approach that would be "the same for perfect and imperfect competition".
Archibald's Challenge and Chicago's Response
The M 2 T economists were evangelical about reconstructing economic theory so as to make it all econometrically testable: "There is a small supply of hypotheses and they are probably all wrong ... The hypothesis must be improved to make sense of the data" (Archibald, 11 February, 4 March 1959) . This process of creative theoretical destruction appears to have involved a deliberate attempt to be fair to those theories that appeared to have been refuted. Marginal productivity, for example, although apparently refuted, could be defended by alibis: "it seems it might be worth trying to check these alibis" (Archibald 1960, 213 Archibald (1961, 21 , 2-5, 7) complained that there was a glaring inconsistency between the Chicago tendency to "cling" to perfect competition and the "'new' or 'Chicago' methodology". When it came to monopolistic competition, the Chicago economists were engineers, not scientists, whose constructions had led them to neglect the "enquiring, scientific question[s]". Archibald outlined an agenda for a wide reaching theoretical and empirical investigation: "we require more facts, not for their own sake, but in order to put into the theory sufficient content for it to yield significant predictions ... the new methodology provides a solution to our difficulties". Archibald was not an advocate of the theory of monopolistic competition, which he found (at the stage it had then reached) to be disappointingly empty.
lxvi Stigler (1962e, xvi) defined the "fundamental characteristic" of scholarship as "the discovery of relevant questions [rather] than the giving of conclusive answers"; and Archibald was clearly attempting to engage the opponents of monopolistic competition by appealing to their own method of research: "this justification should commend itself to Chicago methodologists". Stigler (1983b, 416) wrote of Jevons being "ridiculed into silence"; and Archibald's twenty seven page essay elicited what must be among the shortest replies in the history of economic disputation: "there is a real doubt that any communication between Archibald and me is possible" (Friedman 1963, 66) . Stigler (1946, v) had previously referred to the "greater (or at least more explicit) empirical content ...
[of] the theory of imperfect competition". But now Stigler (1963a, 63 ) merely applauded Archibald's "attack on Chamberlin", and ridiculed his discussion of Chicago as a "detour ... The methodological discussion is a detour on the detour".
In reply, Archibald (1963, 69) could only repeat his complaint about the methodological "inconsistency in Friedman's and Stigler's dismissal of monopolistic competition on apparently a priori grounds". They were, he stated, guilty of "a shocking piece of obscurantism, and an indefensible attempt to close discussion". This response echoed Chamberlin's (1957, 139) complaint about the "set of preposterous misinterpretations so standardised that there could be no questioning the fact of their common intellectual origins". between science and non-science; they appeared to be relocating monopolistic competition on the non-science side of the demarcation line, whilst emphasising the "providential" location of perfect competition on the science side. For Friedman (1953, 9) , "great confidence is attached to [a hypothesis] if it has survived many opportunities for contradiction"; perfect competition survived the opportunity for contradiction offered by Chamberlin and Archibald.
Stigler did not neglect monopolistic competition with his Chicago students at this time; he "eviscerated" the concept and "conduct[ed] a Demolition Derby ... shattering theories with gusto". This training led his students to find only "meaninglessness" from advocates of alternative concepts (Sowell 1993, 787) . lxvii lxviii As macroeconomic paradigmatic challengers, Friedman and Stigler were only too willing to set up the "fox hunts" of controversy. Indeed, according to Stigler (1962c, 1; 1965a, 16 ) the statistical evaluation of economic relationships was the only distinctive trait of modern economics; in his AEA Presidential Address he reiterated that the Keynesian revolution was one of several "minor revisions compared to the vast implications of the growing insistence on quantification ... comparable to the displacement of archers by canons ... I am convinced that economics is finally at the threshold of its golden age -nay, we already have one foot through the door ... the age of quantification is now full upon us". Stigler (1982c, 13, 22-3) repeated this assessment at "the high noon of capitalism … This is the age of quantification … An inconvenient a priori argument can always be eroded or blunted by challenging its exclusion or inclusion of some assumption, but economists find it difficult to resist well-established empirical [emphasis in text] findings".
Stigler "wore his passion for measurement on his sleeve" (Demsetz 1993, 795) ; lxix he also noted the "unfortunate paradox that the more meaningful a concept is for analytical purposes, the less useful it usually is for empirical investigations" (1939, 470) . Stigler (1949a, 103) ran (possibly) the first Keynesian-Monetarist statistical race, finding for the latter a correlation coefficient of 0.904, and for the former, 0.395. The testing procedure by which alternative ideas won or lost status involved "trial by combat" -an art in which Stigler and Friedman were highly skilled; but their stated views on statistical trial by combat were rather different from those of their opponents (Stigler 1988a, 116; 1988c, 12 Samuelson and Solow (1960) outlined the empirical American Phillips Curve trade-off that would unwittingly contribute to the Keynesian demise. The conference ended with a sociological paper from Stigler (1965b Stigler ( [1960 , 17) which sought to explain the "areas of active work and the lines of attack" in the economics profession. The writing of history requires an organising framework: these two implicit 'manifestoes' illuminate much of the succeeding quarter of a century. This paper has specifically examined the Chicago revolution in the light of one of these implicit 'manifestos'.
As Chicago revolutionaries, Stigler and Friedman complemented each other, and it is natural to seek a partial explanation for the success of the Chicago revolution in their combined talents (Friedman 1993, 772; Sowell 1993, 788) . Friedman contributed to the attack on the 'accuracy of assumptions' method of the Keynesians and the advocates of monopolistic competition, and also to the direct assault on the Keynesian hegemony. Stigler brought to the partnership a masterful understanding of the nature of knowledge construction and destruction in the economics profession (and area in which Friedman was a highly perceptive amateur). This Chicago (but Fabian, that is gradualist) intellectual revolution was launched on a profession whose historical sub-discipline had been "permanently declining in professional esteem"; "a nearly moribund subject in the United States" (Stigler 1988a, 28; 1982a [1972 , 85). lxxi For Stigler (1961b, 213) "knowledge is power. And yet it occupies a slum dwelling in the town of economics"
In his definition of competition, Stigler (1968b, 181) Stigler (1971 Stigler ( , 1974 contributed much to the analysis of asymmetric free or cheap rider situations where agents, in the absence of coercion, considered carefully who would appropriate the benefits before taking part in joint ventures. Monetarism and estimating money demand functions became major preoccupations for economists (Desai 1981; Laidler 1977; Stein 1982) ; testing or investigating monopolistic competition never qualified for such attention during that period. Simultaneously, faith in competition rose; while faith in Keynesian economics fell.
lxxv
The defenders of microeconomic orthodoxy believed that the advocates of monopolistic competition had defined terms which "evades the issue, introducing fuzziness and undefinable terms into the abstract model where they have no place, and serves only to make the theory analytically meaningless" (Friedman 1953, 38) . The defenders of Keynesian macroeconomic orthodoxy made similar accusations about the Chicago challengers. Stigler's understanding of the sociology of economic knowledge led him to predict that some commonly accepted theories would have a "low vitality" (1949a, 104); a theory could "limp along for a century, collecting large pieces of good reasoning, and small chunks of empirical evidence but never achieving scientific prosperity"; the academic poverty of a theory could be caused by its concepts having "eluded confident measurement" (1968a, 71). Stigler and Friedman had reasons for not wishing to contribute to the process by which some theories (the ones they disapproved of) acquired confident measurement. Stigler (1969c, 227) recognised that a fertile school requires an opposition with which to argue;
and Stigler and Friedman were supremely skilful in both engaging in -and avoiding -ongoing controversy with their policy opponents: "a scholar is an evangelist seeking to convert his learned brethren to the new enlightenment he is preaching" (Stigler 1988a, 211) . As macroeconomists they were reformers, or revolutionaries; as microeconomists they were conservatives: "Unlike the reformers, who seek to convert, the conservatives seek to defeat ... the successful conservative must also be an innovator" (Stigler 1975, 320-1) . As the paradigmatic challenger, Friedman brilliantly exploited the Keynesian faith in macroeconometric estimation; a faith he did not share (Leeson 1998) . But monopolistic competition was an upstart that had failed to reconstruct microeconomics around the concept of monopoly. Competition was still "the main dish" (Stigler 1968a, 5) ; and microeconomic revolutionaries still had to overcome the "heavy" legacy of pure competition (Chamberlin 1957, 140) . Stigler (1965d, 76) commented on the inherently asymmetric nature of this type of competition: "If you support the majority view, a cliche is often enough to support the position.
It is when you are with the minority that a real burden of evidence is put upon your arguments".
Despite its revolutionary potential, Stigler (1976a, 347; 1968a , 251) thought that monopolistic competition remained a species of "Cambridge eccentricity", which involved "irrelevant numbers" and "dark suspicions". Friedman and Stigler displayed tactical astuteness in declining the invitation to participate in the "Chamberlin versus Chicago" competition.
lxxvi
The Chicago counter-revolution was, in part, the product of superior sociological perceptiveness.
Many Old Keynesians were taken aback by the success of the Chicago revolution of the 1960s and 1970s. Robert Solow (1965, 146) concluded that "I think that most economists feel that short-run macroeconomic theory is pretty well in hand ... The basic outlines of the dominant theory have not changed in years. All that is left is the trivial job of filling in the empty boxes, and that will not take more than fifty years of concentrated effort at a maximum". The prospect of losing their hegemonic position was not, apparently, taken seriously: "Apres moi, la sociologie" (Solow 1967, 119) . But a considerable volume of "sociologie" of economic knowledge preceded the successful Chicago intellectual revolution; much of it authored by George Stigler.
One of Stigler's obituaries closed with Milton Friedman's assessment of the attitude of his friend and collaborator: "let the chips fall where they may, my task is to be objective, accurate and interesting" (cited by McCann and Perlman 1993, 1012) . But Stigler was also acutely interested in sociological questions (Rosenberg 1993, 841) .
lxxvii Combined with this sociological perceptiveness was an almost "irrational ... sense of loyalty ... Much of his work centred around saving the damsel in distress, neoclassicalism, from her attackers" (Friedland 1993, 780; Demsetz 1993, 794; Yordon 1992; Freedman 1995) . lxxviii Chamberlin (1947, 416) According to Stigler (1967c, 356, 361 ) "The only effective challenge to generous opportunism is a trenchant ideology, and that is precisely what we no longer have".
lxxx Stigler (1946, 3) opened the first edition of his Theory of Price textbook with the assessment that "The important purpose of a scientific law is to permit prediction, and prediction is in turn sought because it permits control over phenomena". Stigler and Friedman also sought influence and control over economists' research agenda. It is worth asking why they were (at least temporarily) successful in this regard. Beneath the veil of economics lie some fascinating processes of knowledge construction and destruction that follow laws and tendencies as examinable as the laws and tendencies of economic behaviour.
NOTES
i. This paper was planned around 1990, after having read Neil DeMarchi's account of Popper and the M2T economists. Unfortunately, by the time I got round to writing it, George Stigler and Chris Archibald were dead, and so I never benefited from their thoughts.
ii.. Together with W. Allen Wallis, they were the "three musketeers" of the postwar Chicago School (Leube 1986, xiii) .
iii.. Chamberlin (1957, 93, 148) wrote that "It is possible that the economy should be made 'more competitive'; it is also quite possible that it should be made 'more monopolistic'". He also referred to the "fallacious ideal of perfect competition".
iv.. In 1982, after winning the Nobel prize, Stigler (1988a, 137) held an impromptu press conference at the White House and was "removed from the platform in a manner reminiscent of vaudeville days" after mentioning the word "depression". The unemployment associated with the monetary disinflation of the early Reagan years had rendered this word "obscene". Despite Stigler's lack of tact or discretion, Robert Barro's (1991) concluded that he acquired an influence which "exceeded that of any economist who has spent much time in Washington".
v.. Stigler (1961a, 330) noted that "the study of how economic theory influences views on policy by non-economists is still an essentially unstudied subject".
vi.. Melvin Reder (correspondence 1 June 1997) is doubtful that this presentation would have been successful: "I doubt that he would have owned up to it, even if he had been made aware of it. George was very sceptical of 'big think' in all its forms and very likely would have tried hard to puncture such a theory had it been presented to him".
vii.. Chamberlin (1957, 300) juxtaposed two quotes from Stigler and Friedman (emphasising the repetitive use of the word 'meaninglessness') and concluded that "The idea is virtually the same, and I am unfortunately unable to identify its origins as between the two writers cited".
viii.. Johnson arrived at Chicago in 1959, shortly after Stigler's return According to Shils (1977, 87) , Johnson found the atmosphere uncongenial and considered leaving shortly after arriving. One of the first articles he published at Chicago was entitled 'The Consumer and Madison Avenue'; but the title "epitomizes the pervasive and subtly corrupting influence of the hucksters on the American way of life" and had been chosen for him by "a senior professor of economics who is presumably more expert than I in the mass marketing of economic wares" (1960, 3).
ix.. McCloskey (correspondence 26 September 1997) also reflected that "I was nearly the last student of Chamberlain at Harvard. It was a strange experience to go from an environment in which one sneered at Stigler to one in which one sneered at Chamberlin".
x. There is evidence in Stigler's writings to support these concerns. Stigler (1967d) , for example, in criticising Galbraith's framework as a "poor vehicle to carry us to an understanding of our times" also stated that he was guilty of making a "nightime leap over the ocean of motive". xi.. "Here was a Chicago theory that didn't even annoy socialists!" (Stigler 1986 (Stigler [1982 , 144).
xii.. Stigler (1987a, 52) reflected that "a great nation can survive and prosper no matter how misinformed its political leaders".
xiii.. Whilst advising Presidential candidate Barry Goldwater, Friedman noted (on leave at Columbia) a chink in the Old Keynesian armour: "I was appalled at what I found. There was an unbelievable degree of intellectual homogeneity, of acceptance of a standard set of views complete with cliche answers to every objection, of smug self-satisfaction at belonging to an ingroup. The closest similar experience I have ever had was at Cambridge, England, and even that was a distant second. The homogeneity and provincialism of the New York intellectual community made them pushovers in discussions about Goldwater's views. They had cliche answers but only to their self-created straw men. To exaggerate only slightly, they had never talked to anyone who really believed, and had thought deeply about, views drastically different from their own. As a result, when they heard real arguments they had no answers, only amazement ..." (1974, 16; see also Stigler 1973a ).
xiv.. Rose Friedman (1976a, 30; 1976b, 23 ) described Stigler as "one of our dearest friends". It was Stigler who persuaded the Friedmans to come to the University of Minnesota in 1945.
xv.. Friedman was President of the Society during its twenty fifth anniversary and believed that it should disband having accomplished its major purpose (Rose Friedman 1976 (9) , 26).
xvi.. "George was and is a delight and a treasure as a friend and as an intellectual influence ... Few economists have germinated so many new ideas and so profoundly influenced the course of economic research" (Friedman 1986, 84) .
xvii.. Friedman (1976, 235) wrote: "let there be an unanticipated decline in aggregate demand, so that employers are willing to hire fewer workers at each real wage rate as perceived by them. Workers searching for jobs will find fewer offers that, on the basis of their unchanged anticipations, are attractive enough to compensate them for giving up the search. The average time between jobs will lengthen, and so will recorded unemployment. As the less attractive employment situation becomes more widely known, job-seekers will revise their anticipation about opportunities, become less choosy, and recorded unemployment will decline towards its natural level". Stigler's (1962a, 94, 104) 'Information in the Labor Market' is concerned, in large part, with the problem of how job seekers "acquire information on the wage rate ... a highly rewarding area for future research".
xviii.. Rosen (1993, 813-4) concluded that Stigler's unrelenting opposition to monopolistic competition hindered the development of the economics of product differentiation.
xix.. Keynes did not utilise an imperfect competition framework in the General Theory for tactical reasons: he apparently informed Gardiner Means that he "wanted to beat the buggers at their own game" (cited by Marris 1992 Marris , 1241 .
xx. At least one (recently arrived) Chicago economist concluded that economists were no longer "concerned with matters of vital importance to the affluence society"; and had turned away "from intellectual interest into professional competence" as expressed in mathematical and econometric techniques (Johnson 1960, 119-120) .
xxi.. Stigler (1970, 426; 1957a, 159; 1982a, vii, 86) cautioned that "biography distorts rather than illuminates the understanding of scientific work", although he also thought that Rogin's history of economic theory intentionally added little, but unintentionally shed "an illuminating light" on a species of American late-New Deal radical thought.
xxii.. Sherwin Rosen (correspondence, 23 April 1997) recalled that the question of influence came up in conversations with Stigler "rather often, but in a rather oblique casual way and not particularly in a formal way". Deirdre McCloskey (correspondence, 2 June 1997) recalled that "they were self-conscious counter-revolutionaries. They talked about it all the time".
xxiii.. Empirical workers "do not give [their] generalisations the abstract and systematic formulation that characterises conventional economic theory. As a result, the generalisations seem closely bound to the specific empirical researches on which they are based, and they lend themselves much less to cumulative refinement and elaboration and to widening areas of application".
xxiv.. He argued that "received theory deserves more respect and quantitative materials less respect than are commonly accorded them". xxv.. "Unless an author explicitly sets out to refute a theory, one should characterise his attitude towards that theory as favourable, or at worst neutral, if he actually refers to the theory. For he is reviving its currency and advertising its existence" (1978, 196) .
xxvi.. "The theorist is a dangerous person to let loose on economic reform" (1980, 349) .
xxvii.. He stated that "two thirds at a minimum made no positive contribution to received knowledge on oligopoly behaviour: they contain neither a new fact nor a new idea [emphasis in text]". Likewise, papers that were critical of Reaganomics contained 94 percent malice and about 2 percent knowledge (1988d, 91).
xxviii.. The "scientific content of a man's work is the content as interpreted by his contemporaries" (1990b, 765).
xxix.. Stigler (1949a, 95) also noted that: "Tactically this is perhaps Lord Keynes's greatest contribution: his contributions need not be itemised". xxxi.. Whatever Stigler's motives, he succeeded in provoking his audience; Robert Solow thought that the contents of his Harvard lecture were "untrue" (1970, 98; see also Coats 1960 and Rothbard 1960) . Robert Solow (correspondence 23 April 1997) points out that his friendship with Stigler transcended any disagreements they had over economics; Stigler was "never an ideologue" (Solow cited by Passell 1991).
xxxii.. For example, Stigler (1989, 659-660) declined to deal in detail with a "discursive and imprecise" History of Political Economy review of his essay on Smith and public choice.
xxxiii.. "The strong hostility of most intellectuals towards Madison Avenue is possibly due to the rivalry between the two groups. Could the failure of Madison Avenue to reciprocate this overt dislike be an instance of the professional's indifference to the amateur? " (1975, 317) .
xxxiv.. Stigler (1988a, 108-9; 1962b, 1; 1964b, 20; 1964c, 83) was only "provoked to attack" Means' theory of price determination -after it became integral to macroeconomic fox hunts of controversy via the Kefauver Committee on administered pricing and inflation; and when it seemed there may be "No End to Means". The few remaining economists with an interest in administered prices were left "[without] a subject".
xxxv.. "The fact, however, is indisputable that economists generally abandoned a traditional doctrine [the quantity theory of money] in important part because of a question of fact which they decided by casual observation ... A single contrary observation causes consternation, for the whole edifice may tumble -indeed it will tumble if a few prominent economists capitulate".
xxxvi.. He also reflected that "a formal position" was easier to overcome than an opposition that was "inarticulate and unrationalised" (1966b, 278).
xxxvii.. Knight had a functional, almost tactics-driven approach to economic theory and its history: "to contribute to the understanding of how by consensus based upon rational discussion we can fashion liberal society in which individual freedom is preserved and a satisfactory economic performance achieved" (Stigler 1987b, 57-8) . In an unpublished lecture, Knight stated that "truth in society is like strychnine in the individual body, medicinal in special conditions and minute doses; otherwise and in general a deadly poison ..." (cited by Stigler 1987b, 59 ).
xxxviii.. Knight advised his students that "You can be with the majority or you can be in the right" (Patinkin 1973, 798) . Rose Friedman (1976, 30) who was Knight's research assistant (1934-6) recalled that Knight's scepticism "unfortunately discouraged some of his students from making the contribution that they might otherwise have made". xxxix.. Stigler (1962d, 71) thought the title invited a "slovenly stereotype"; it was also geographically inaccurate in that Friedman, he rather provocatively claimed, was the leader of the "Berkeley-Cambridge axis".
xl.. Stigler has been accused of misinterpreting the Coase Theorem; Coase stated this in conversation, and hinted at it in his writing (correspondence from McCloskey 3 June 1997; McCloskey 1997). Stigler (1966a, 113) wrote that "the Coase theorem thus asserts that under perfect competition private and social costs will be equal ... this procedure obviously leads to the correct social results"; it was a "remarkable proposition to us older economists who have believed the opposite for a generation". Coase (1988, 14; 1993, 239-240, 249) xli.. This agenda (law and economics, the economics of the state, regulation etc) increasingly dominated research at Chicago and "George was as much product of this atmosphere as producer" (correspondence from Reder, 1 June 1997).
xlii.. "The traditional approach has tended to obscure the nature of the choice that has to be made ... the suggested courses of action are inappropriate" (Coase 1960, 1-2) .
xliii.. Referring to "focus", Telser continued: "I believe this is the main lesson I learned from Friedman" (correspondence 29 April 1997).
xliv.. Bhagwati's obituary of Johnson was not well received at Chicago; it was perceived to be self-serving and inaccurate (correspondence from McCloskey 2 June 1997). Friedman (correspondence, 5 February 1995) took great exception to aspects of it. He also recalled that "So far as I know, the seminars were never testing imperfect competition yet there is an element of truth in what Bhagwati said. That is that most of the empirical work that was going on was undertaken to see whether the simple assumption of competitive hypotheses for apparently imperfectly competitive industries led to results that were contradicted or not contradicted by the available evidence. However, that did not arise from any attempt to test imperfect competition but, much more fundamentally, to see how you much you could explain by the competitive approach and how much was left that would have to be explained by monopoly. There were also quite a number of articles during that period which offered explanations relying on monopolistic competition positions for many observed phenomena such as retail price fixing, tie-in arrangements, and the like". Lester Telser (correspondence 28 April 1997) also informed me of the empirical work on issues raised by monopolistic competition by members of the industrial organisation group at Chicago (e.g. Telser 1962a Telser , 1962b Telser and 1971 Demsetz 1962 ).
Telser also points out that Stigler's Theory of Price (1966, 32, n18) refers to one of these articles (Telser 1962b (Bain 1967, 150-3) ; Chamberlin provided an "inspiring vision of realistic economics" (Kuenne 1967, v) ; "it has to be recognised that a general abandonment of the assumption of perfect competition, a universal adoption of the assumption of monopoly, must have very destructive consequences for economic theory" (Hicks 1946, 83) . Bronfenbrenner (1950, 82-3) offered a "compromise" by attempting to integrate monopolistic competition into economic theory "without disturbing the fundamentals of neoclassical economic thought".
xlvi.. Edward Mason, Gardiner Means and others at Harvard pioneered The Market Concentration Doctrine (Demsetz 1973) which is associated with the development of industrial organisation as a subdivision of economics (Phillips and Stevenson 1974 xlix. One reviewer claimed that he had "unduly idealised" limited competition, just as the older generation had previously done with perfect competition (Nichol 1934, 337) .
l.. Chamberlin (1962, 5, n4, 226, n1) Price (1942, v) was written with the intention of including this material at a later date.
liii.. Stigler (1940, 364) complained about monographs which paid no attention to market forms "other than perfect competition and simple monopoly".
liv.. "George and I carried on an intensive correspondence while he was exiled to Brown and Columbia. On perusing the surviving records recently, I was struck by his contribution to my methodology article, in the course of exchanges between us about an article that he was writing on imperfect competition" (Friedman 1993, 770) .
lv.. The Friedman-Stigler correspondence shows a concern about the struggle for influence: "I keep feeling that you arouse skepticism and opposition by stopping where you do ...
[elaboration] will create sympathy for and receptiveness to your thesis and make the paper much more influential" (letters from Stigler to Friedman, cited by Hammond 1991b, 12, 23 ). Friedman's methodology was constructed in opposition to the desire for descriptive 'realism' and the 'assumption questioning' tendency of both monopolistic competition and Keynesian macroeconomics. One rhetorical device employed by Friedman (1953, 3) was to invoke the authority of Keynes (John Neville, The Scope and Method of Political Economy) in the opening sentence of his famous methodological essay. Ten years earlier, Stigler (1943, 358, n7) noted the potential potency of this rhetorical device: "I did not realise how neglected this excellent book had become in America until, when I recently referred to it, several friends expressed surprise that I did not know Keynes' middle name was Maynard!" lvi.. "A good deal of support for this theory stems from the mistaken demand for correspondence between 'reality' and premises". Chamberlin, a "true revolutionary", and his disciples had assigned a "fundamentally mistaken role ... to general theory". The Walrasian theory of general equilibrium had "proven to be relatively uninformative"; formalism, in its mathematical guise, "should not be made a puppet of a scientific oligarchy". This had been the "period of the clever gadget and the plausible surmise ... the triumph of statistics over history as the source of empirical knowledge", when hasty statistical studies falsely concluded that the consumption function was more stable than the velocity of money.
lvii.. "My appraisal of the theory in 1947 was stimulated more by a growing interest in the empirical testing of theories than by the intrinsic interest of the kinked demand curve ... The main task of the article was a test of the empirical fruitfulness of the theory".
lviii.. In 1995, Milton Friedman very kindly invited me to visit him at the Hoover Institution, but the day before I arrived he suffered a stroke and he was only able to spend an afternoon with me. While he was in hospital I spoke to a number of his colleagues. One Senior Fellow expressed his admiration for both Friedman and Stigler but was surprised when they both walked out of a seminar given by a newly recruited junior economist who had expressed support for some aspects of Galbraith's work. The junior economist was promptly removed from the Hoover Institution. Likewise, Galbraith (1978, 150-1) did not forget his adversaries. The Hoover Institution economists who advocated the "romance" of deregulation were "trying to recapture the world of Herbert Hoover -it's a very worthy ideal, intellectual archaeology as it were. Once ageing and righteous scholars of conservative mood dreamt of going to Heaven. Now it's to the American Enterprise Institute". Galbraith (1981, 31) was told that Friedman opposed his nomination as AEA President: "he offered as his clinching evidence that Veblen had never been president". Mark Perlman (correspondence 6 June 1997) was present when Friedman was chairman of the nomination committee: "Friedman can be a perfect gentleman, and he presented [Galbraith's] nomination in good grace. All present knew what pain it cost him, but we all admired his composure".
lix.. "With the decline of independent marker behaviour -or perhaps more accurately its decay as a plausible assumption -a gap has been left in our explanation of the operative mechanics by which the economy is governed". lx.. Stigler (1943, 357) attributed responsibility for the decline in the prestige of economists to Galbraith's Office of Price Administration, where he had briefly been employed (Telser 1996, 2) . Later, he attributed the "weakened ... status" of economists to their high profile involvement in the government apparatus (1967c, 360). Later still, Stigler (1987a, 56) referred to Galbraith's "impressive record for error".
lxi. Senator Kefauver (1965 Kefauver ( [1963 , 211-2, 180-1), the Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, suggested that "to give us a new focus for our thinking" a "new term" was required; replacing 'private enterprise' with 'collective enterprises' or 'private socialism' or 'private economic government'. Kefauver also noted the availability of a "plethora" of government statistics with which to pursue these investigations: "There has been something of a tendency to gather statistics which might be valuable in the examination of a 'controversial' topic" [emphasis in text].
lxii.. Stigler (1943, 529) thought that the "chief policy applications" of national income figures were made to monetary analyses.
lxiii.. Friedman (1965, 51) stated that "there is no general theory of the second best. There is the proposition that there may exist a theory of the second best".
lxiv.. Friedman and John Savage (1948, 282) in their 'Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk', proposed "a crude empirical test by bringing together a few broad observations"; but Archibald (1959b, 437) proposed "a crucial test" which Friedman and Savage had "apparently overlooked".
lxv.. This was comment 20 in Stigler's (1977, 442) Stigler (1964b, 20) regarded as an academic employment-creating research agenda.
lxviii.. Lester Telser (1964, 562, n20, 558 ) found Archibald's challenge "interesting" but deficient with respect to the identification problem; he found little empirical support for an inverse association between advertising and competition, "despite some plausible theorising to the contrary".
lxix.. Rosenberg (1993, 837) concluded that "no previous scholar had ever examined the development of the discipline with anything like the same insistence that intellectual progress had to be measured in terms of its ability to generate empirically refutable implications". lxx.. Stigler (1988a, 116) wrote: "The computer has made it easy to fish for results. If the statistical analysis doesn't come out 'right' the first or the twentieth time, one can drop a year from the data, add a new variable to explain contradictions, take the logarithm of another variable, and so on until, lo, the desired answer appears -all in just a few minutes". Econometricians were the "most quarrelsome class of economists" (1988c, 12).
lxxi.. Stigler contributed to this development: in 1972, he successfully proposed that the history of thought requirement be dropped at Chicago. Most other economics departments later followed suit (Rosen 1993, 811) . At the same meeting Stigler unsuccessfully proposed that the economic history requirement also be dropped (correspondence from McCloskey 2 June 1997).
lxxii.. " [W] e would be shocked if two teams called off the event".
lxxiii.. Archibald and Rosenbluth (1975, 588) outlined some of "the implications of an analytically tractable definition of a monopolistically competitive group".
lxxiv.. In another context, Stigler (1943, 357) deplored the constraint that some approaches to economics imposed: "The familiar admonition not to argue over differences in taste leads not only to dull conversation but also to bad sociology". With respect to "the economics of scholarly advice ... I have always thought that revealed preference is the only reliable guide to what a scholar believes to be fruitful research problems: If he doesn't work on them, he provides no reason for us to do so" (Stigler 1981, 76) .
lxxv.. According to the Director of the Hoover Institution (Campbell 1986, x) , this renewed faith in competition and deregulation was due to Stigler's Copernican-like role.
lxxvi.. As Reder put it: "Why should Friedman or Stigler have entered into a controversy which could, at best, only serve to highlight a possible deficiency of laissez-faire and (in their view) exaggerate its importance" (correspondence 1 June 1997).
lxxvii.. Rosenberg (1993, 841) described some of Stigler's questions as "whether there were laws or regularities shaping the growth of knowledge itself ... How does the research agenda of any science get to be determined? ... How do scientists persuade one another? To put it in its boldest possible form: What are the underlying laws governing the evolution of a science?" lxxviii.. Stigler (1986 Stigler ( [1981 , 333) referred to "my friend, the competitive economy". Deviations from neoclassical perspectives produced, in James Meade's work, "bastard demand curves" (Stigler 1966c, 479) . During the War, he passionately objected to (finding it "especially hard to excuse") a book that remained silent about political questions: "Is the purpose of the study of economics the production of impartial pages? Has the democratic citizen no moral responsibility to state and strive for that order of things which he believes is best?" (Stigler 1943c, 78) .
lxxix.. "Not only do we not know how to teach students how to invent theories, but much of the advice is surely wrong. The admonition to keep one's mind open and sceptical, for example, is fatal. Every useful hypothesis will soon encounter facts that are at least superficially adverse, and one must love one's own creations and cling stubbornly to them until the contradictory evidence is overwhelming. On the whole economists fully meet this recommendation".
lxxx. Some of his critics found his testing procedures to be defective: "a triumph of ideology over scholarship" (Friend and Herman 1964, 382) .
